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Words, Conduct, Caste
Cass R. Sunsteint
How do we know what counts as speech and what counts as
conduct? When is government disabled from regulating conduct
that is intended to express ideas? What is the relationship between
constitutional principles of equality and constitutional principles
of free expression? And how do these questions bear on current
controversies over pornography and hate speech? In this Essay, I
propose some answers to these questions. I offer these general
propositions:
1. As a matter of history and principle, the constitutional commitment to equality should be understood as a prohibition against
systems with caste-like features. Courts should play a cautious role
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in eliminating the caste-like features of current society; the job of
implementation belongs mostly to the elected branches of government. Although speech is hardly the principal culprit, some forms
of expression can contribute to the maintenance of such systems.
2. Whether words or not, symbols count as speech within the
meaning of the First Amendment if they are intended and received
as part of the exchange of ideas.
3. Whether words or not, symbols count as "high value"
speech-regulable only under the rarest circumstances-if they are
intended and received as part of public deliberation about some
issue. Through this distinction, I mean to reassert the line between
political speech on the one hand and other forms of communication on the other.
4. Even if they are words, symbols not intended and received
as part of the exchange of ideas are not protected by the First
Amendment at all.
5. Some speech does not merely cause but actually is an independent unlawful act.
To decide First Amendment cases, these propositions are
hardly enough. It is necessary to look not only at whether and how
"speech" is involved, but also at the means by which government
regulates speech. There are three principal kinds of restrictions on
speech: viewpoint-based, content-based, and content-neutral.1
Government cannot regulate speech on the basis of viewpoint; that
is, it may not single out for approval or disapproval a particular
point of view. Content-based but viewpoint-neutral regulation is
presumed unconstitutional, but it is acceptable in certain, narrow
circumstances. Content-neutral restrictions are evaluated through
a balancing test, one that looks at the extent of the harm, the existence of alternative outlets, the availability of less restrictive
means of regulation, and so forth.
These general propositions lead to some concrete conclusions
for hate speech and pornography:
1. Racial hate speech, including cross-burning, often qualifies
as speech. In some circumstances, it is high-value speech. Much
racist speech belongs at the free speech core because it is a selfconscious contribution to social deliberation about political issues.
Government may, of course, regulate such speech through the trespass laws or through other content-neutral methods. In many of

I The best discussions are Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First
Amendment, 25 Wm & Mary L Rev 189 (1983); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions,54 U Chi L Rev 46 (1987).
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the hard cases, the question is whether the relevant regulation is
adequately neutral.
2. Courts should uphold very narrow, content-based restrictions on hate speech if the speech in question is not reasonably
taken to be part of the exchange of ideas. Colleges and universities
ought to have mildly broader authority over hate speech, because
restrictions on some such speech may be necessary to the educational mission.
3. Certain forms of pornography count as speech, but they are
not plausibly intended or received as a contribution to political deliberation, and they fall within the low-value category. They may
be regulated on the basis of a lesser showing of harm than the First
Amendment requires for regulation of political speech.
4. Sexual and racial discrimination in the workplace can be
analyzed in either of two ways. We might treat discrimination, if
purely verbal, as low-value speech, regulable because of the distinctive harms it causes. Alternatively, we might say that some
forms of discrimination amount to the commission of acts that
may be prohibited by law.
There is a broader agenda behind these claims. Sometimes
constitutional doctrine seems to have lost sight of the point of central constitutional commitments. Sometimes the commitment to
free speech seems like an abstraction insufficiently closely connected with democratic goals, or indeed with any clearly describable set of governing aspirations. A good first step is to insist that
the First Amendment has a point, or a set of points, that this includes the promotion of a well-functioning democratic system, and
that the interpretation of the Amendment should have this goal in
mind. Similarly, the commitment to equality sometimes seems to
have lost sight of its original foundations in the commitment to the
rejection of the system of caste. Sometimes it seems as if equality,
as a constitutional concept, has no clear connection to this commitment, or to any identifiable commitment at all. Of course there are
sharp institutional limits on the capacities of courts to promote the
goals of the Civil War Amendments, as the framers were well
aware.' Enforcement of those goals now seems to have fallen to
other branches-a highly salutary development-and when Congress and the President have attempted to carry forward their constitutional responsiblities, courts should be hospitable rather than
grudging.

' See text accompanying notes 9-11.
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This Essay is organized into five sections. Section I briefly sets
out an equality principle that bears on free speech problems. Using
conventional doctrinal categories, Section II offers an argument for
allowing regulation of certain forms of pornography and hate
speech. Section III discusses the view that regulation of this kind is
impermissibly selective. Section IV attempts to sort out some complex issues involving the distinction between words and conduct.
Section V outlines some possible directions for the future; it pays
special attention to the possibility of preventing harms through
strategies that do not raise First Amendment problems.
I.

A.

THE ANTICASTE PRINCIPLE-AND FREE SPEECH

Caste

I am concerned here with the relationship between equality
and free speech. To discuss that relationship, we must first identify
the appropriate conception of equality. At the origin, the central
target of the Fourteenth Amendment was not irrational distinctions based on race, but rather the system of racial caste in-American society.3 For those who ratified the post-Civil War Amendments, the problem was that the law had contributed to a system
of caste based on race, thought to be a morally irrelevant
characteristic.
Those who framed and ratified these Amendments were aware
that the system of racial hierarchy had often been attributed to
nature. Thus in the aftermath of the American Civil War, it was
expressly urged, "God himself has set His seal of distinctive difference between the two races, and no human legislation can overrule
the Divine decree. ' '4 In the same period, antidiscrimination law
was challenged squarely on the ground that it put the two races in
"unnatural relation . . . to each other."' The post-Civil War
Amendments thus rejected the supposed naturalness of racial hierarchy. The framers thought this hierarchy was a function not of
natural difference but of law, most notably the law of slavery and

I See Charles Fairman, Does The Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of
Rights: The Original Understanding,2 Stan L Rev 5, 21-24, 138-39 (1949); Cass R. Sunstein, The PartialConstitution 340-41 (Harvard, 1993).
4 Speech of Representative M.L Southard, 43d Cong, 1st Sess (Jan 7, 1874), in 2 Cong
Rec app 1, 3.
5 43d Cong, 2d Sess (Fed 4, 1875), in 3 Cong Rec 983 (statement of Representative
Eldredge).
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the various measures that grew up in the aftermath of abolition.6
The animating purpose of the Civil War Amendments was an attack on racial caste.
We might similarly understand the problem of sex discrimination as the existence of a caste-like system, based on gender and
often operating through law. That system, like the racial caste system and others as well, is often attributed to "nature" and "natural differences." Consider here Mill's remarks:
But was there any domination which did not appear natural
to those who possessed it? . . . So true is it that unnatural
generally means only uncustomary, and that everything which
is usual appears natural. The subjection of women to men being a universal custom, any departure from it quite naturally
appears unnatural.7
A principal feature of the caste system based on gender consists of
legal and social practices that translate women's sexual and reproductive capacities into a source of second-class citizenship. Consider, for example, inequalities in political influence, the disproportionate subjection of women to poverty and sexual violation, and
differences in educational opportunity and health care.8
In these circumstances, I suggest that the appropriate equality
principle in the areas of both race and sex equality is an opposition
to caste. The legal objection should be understood as an effort to
eliminate, in places large and small, caste-like discrimination
rooted in race and gender. The controlling principle is not that
blacks and women must be treated "the same" as whites and men,
but that blacks and women must not be second-class citizens.
With respect to vindication of the anticaste principle, there
are important differences between the obligations of the courts and

Consider, for example, Senator Pratt's remarks during debate on proposed amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1875: "You object because they have been a servile race and
are as yet unfit to perform the duties of citizenship. But who made them slaves and kept
them in ignorance?" 43d Cong, 1st Sess (May 20, 1874), in 2 Cong Rec 4082.
John Stuart Mill, The Subjection of Women, reprinted in John M. Robson, ed, 21
Collected Works of John Stuart Mill 259, 269-70 (Toronto, 1984). Compare this description
of attitudes in prerevolutionary America:
So distinctive and so separated was the aristocracy from ordinary folk that many still
thought the two groups represented two orders of being ....
Ordinary people were
thought to be different physically, and because of varying diets and living conditions,
no doubt in many cases they were different. People often assumed that a handsome
child, though apparently a commoner, had to be some gentleman's bastard offspring.
Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution 27 (Knopf, 1992).
" See Mary Becker, Politics,Differences and Economic Rights, 1989 U Chi Legal F 169,
for a discussion of many of these inequalities.
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the obligations of legislatures. It should not be forgotten that the
nation originally anticipated legislative enforcement of the obligations of the Civil War Amendments. 9 Indeed, the judicial enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment stands as one of the most
profound ironies in constitutional history. In the aftermath of the
Dred Scott decision, the ratifiers anticipated legislative rather than
judicial implementation of the Civil War Amendments, and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment was thought especially
important. 10
History aside, a high degree of judicial caution is justified on
many grounds. Courts lack the relevant factfinding abilities and
policymaking competence. Because their judgments are not selfimplementing, judges often fail when they attempt to produce
large-scale social reform.1" There are also serious problems of democratic legitimacy when courts seek to introduce large changes on
their own. For these reasons, courts ought to play a cautious role in
the elimination of caste. But the need for judicial caution should
not obscure the substantive point: The anticaste principle lies at
the heart of the constitutional prohibition, and that principle imposes substantial duties on Congress and the President.
The concept of caste by no means defines itself. I will have to
offer a brief and inadequate account here. 12 In so doing I do not
suggest that the caste-like features of all societies containing race
and sex inequality are the same. Certainly, the American system of
race and sex discrimination is far less oppressive than most systems of racial and gender caste. But I do claim that the caste-like
features are what justify social and legal concern.
The motivating idea behind an anticaste principle is, broadly
speaking, Rawlsian in character. 3 It holds that without very good
reasons, social and legal structures ought not to turn morally-irrelevant differences into social disadvantages, and certainly not if the
disadvantage is systemic. A difference is morally irrelevant if it has
no relationship to individual entitlement or desert. Race and sex
are certainly morally irrelevant characteristics in this sense; the
bare fact of skin color or gender does not entitle one to social superiority. Of course, individual needs may depend in part on race or
9 See Fairman, 2 Stan L Rev at 21-24 (cited in note 3).
10

Id at 57-58.

See Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social
Change? 13-21 (Chicago, 1991); Donald Horowitz, The Courts and Social Policy 255-93
(Brookings, 1977).
12 For more detail, see Sunstein, The Partial Constitution at 338-46 (cited in note 3).
11 See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice § 3 at 12 (Harvard, 1971).
'
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gender, and those needs may bear on what government should
4
do.

1

A systemic disadvantage is one that operates along standard
and predictable lines in multiple important spheres of life, and applies in realms that relate to basic participation as a citizen in a
democracy. These realms include education, health care, freedom
from private and public violence, wealth, political representation,
and political influence. 15 The anticaste principle means that one
group ought not to be systematically beneath another with respect
to basic human capabilities and functionings.1' A particular concern is that self-respect and its social bases ought not to be distributed along the lines of race and gender. 17 The social practices in a
system of caste produce a range of obstacles to the development of
self-respect, largely because of the presence of the morally irrelevant characteristic that gives rise to caste-like status.
In the areas of race and sex discrimination, the problem is precisely this sort of systemic disadvantage. A social or biological difference systematically subordinates the relevant group-not because of "nature," but because of social and legal practices. The
resulting inequality occurs in multiple spheres and along multiple
indices of social welfare: poverty, education, health, political
power, employment, susceptibility to violence and crime, and so
forth. 8 That is the caste system to which the legal system should
respond. This point does not deny the fact of biological difference
or even biological disadvantage. I do not claim that there would be
equality in the state of nature, a question that is irrelevant for our
purposes. 9 The point is that social and legal practices make biological differences count, or matter, and this point is not falsified
by showing what would happen in "nature." What is at issue is
whether the social and legal practices are justified.

1, See Amartya Sen, Inequality Reexamined 113 (Harvard, 1992).
15

Compare John Rawls, PoliticalLiberalism 227-30 (Columbia, 1993) (discussing "con-

stitutional essentials").

14 On capabilities and functionings, see Sen, Inequality Reexamined at 39-55; Amartya

Sen, Commodities and Capabilities 51-71 (Elsevier Science, 1985); Martha C. Nussbaum,
Aristotelian Social Democracy, in R. Bruce Douglass, Gerald R. Mara, and Henry S. Richardson, eds, Liberalism and the Good 203, 208-17 (Routledge, 1990).
17 Self-respect is emphasized in Rawls, A Theory of Justice § 67 at 440-42; and Rawls,

PoliticalLiberalism at 318.
18 Some of the relevant data is catalogued in Joni Seager and Ann Olson, Women in the
World: An International Atlas (Pluto, 1986); Debbie Taylor, Women in Analysis, in

Women: A World Report 1-98 (Oxford, 1985).
19 See John Stuart Mill, Nature, in Three Essays on Religion 3, 46-54 (Henry Holt,

1884).
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B. Speech
Very provisionally, I propose that the free speech principle attempts to protect all symbols, whether or not words, that contribute to the exchange of ideas. (I offer many refinements and qualifications below.) Thus understood, the free speech principle can
march hand-in-hand with the anticaste principle, and there is usually no tension between them. When tension does arise, courts
ought to minimize infringements on either principle. But it is certainly imaginable that unrestricted speech can contribute to gender and racial caste. For example, a principal feature of a caste
system consists of disproportionate subjection to public and private violence. Acts that are symbolic and expressive in character-like some lynchings and some rapes-are important features
of a constitutionally unacceptable caste system. But the problem is
not limited to expressive acts. It is plausible that in their production and use, some forms of pornography are associated with violence against women. 20 It is also plausible that both pornography

and racial hate speech have corrosive consequences on the self-respect of women and blacks. In these circumstances, unrestricted
speech may contribute to the maintenance of a system with castelike features.
The constitutional task then is to interpret the free speech
and anticaste principles in such a way as to accommodate both aspirations. We might perform this task in two ways. First, the definition of protected speech could seek to exclude the most damaging forms of expression, on the theory that those forms do not
belong in the "top tier" of constitutional protection and can be
regulated because they cause sufficient harms. Second, the government might be permitted to justify certain narrow restrictions on
speech by reference to the Civil War Amendments, by claiming
that the interest in equality is sufficiently neutral and weighty to
support those restrictions.21 I will invoke both of these strategies
below.

20
21

See text accompanying notes 55-57.
See Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Comment: The Case of the

Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 106 Harv L Rev 124, 151-60 (1992).
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II.

CONVENTIONAL DOCTRINE

In this Section, I set the debate over pornography and hate
speech in the context of general First Amendment doctrine.2 2 Current law distinguishes between low-value and high-value speech; it
treats bribery, perjury, unlicensed medical and legal advice, misleading commercial speech, and much else as bannable on the basis
of a lesser showing of harm.2 3 An approach of this sort is not only
embedded in current law; it is also practically unavoidable. There
is no way to run a system of free expression without making distinctions between different forms of speech in terms of their centrality to free speech ideals. I suggest that much pornography
stands far afield of those ideals and is regulable because of the tangible harms that it causes. Hate speech often does stand at the free
speech core, but it can be regulated (a) in a content-neutral way, as
through the trespass laws, and (b) with narrow controls on epithets
amounting to "fighting words." I also suggest that colleges and universities should have mildly greater authority over this form of
speech.
A.

Pornography

A now-familiar position, originally developed by Andrea Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon, has emerged on the question of legal control of pornography. 2 4 The precise nature of this position is
of course a matter of controversy. As I shall present the argument
here, the basic claim is that sexually explicit speech should be regulated not because it is sexually explicit (the problem of "obscenity") but because and when it merges sex with violence (the problem of "pornography"). The problem of pornography does not
stem from offense, from public access to sexually explicit materials,
from an unregulated erotic life, or from violation of traditional values or community standards. Instead, the problem consists of tangible real-world harms, caused by the portrayal of women and children as objects for the control and use of others, most prominently

12 I draw here on Cass R. Sunstein, Neutrality in ConstitutionalLaw (With Special
Reference to Pornography,Abortion, and Surrogacy), 92 Colum L Rev 1, 13-29 (1992), and
Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Expression ch 5 (Free Press, 1993).
", See, for example, Chaplinsky v New Hampshire, 315 US 568, 571-72 (1942); Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy v Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 US 748, 770-73
(1976); Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc., 418 US 323, 339-40 (1974).
U See Andrea Dworkin, Pornography:Men Possessing Women (Perigree, 1981); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law 146-62 (Harvard,
1987).
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through sexual violence. The objection to pornography is thus
closely associated with the anticaste principle, as that principle
manifests itself in many efforts to prevent sex-related violence. 25
1.

Pornography, coercion, and violence.

My argument here thus deals with pornography that involves
violence or coercion 26 and with the claim that pornography should
be regulated because and when it harms women. Not all of those
who focus on this problem understand it in this way. Some people
treat pornography as a problem of sex discrimination not only because of its association with coercion and violence, but also because
it is connected with subordination and dehumanization more generally.27 It is certainly reasonable to think that non-violent material might portray women in a subordinate way, or treat women as
objects for the use and control of others, and that here too there is
reason for legal concern. If we moved beyond coercion and violence, we might ask more broadly about the role of pornography in
creating inequality through the sexual subordination or objectification of women. I restrict the discussion here, however, to pornography that is associated with violence or coercion either in its production or in its use. I do so for two reasons. First, subjection to
violence and coercion is an important ingredient in sexual inequality. Second, the broader understanding of the harms that pornography produces raises trickier First Amendment difficulties; it is
helpful to begin with a relatively narrow understanding.
2.

Civil vs. criminal remedies.

The approach I am discussing involves not a criminal ban, but
a civil remedy for those who can prove actual harm as a result of
pornography. 8 This remedy would work most simply on behalf of
women abused in the production of pornography. It would also offer a tort-like remedy for women who can prove, under normal le25 See MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified at 32-45, 166-95.
26 1 use the words "violence" and "coercion" in their most conventional sense. It is

possible that someone could be coerced to participate in nonviolent pornography, and this
could be tortious under the approach I am suggesting.
217See, for example, Rae Langton, Whose Right?: Ronald Dworkin, Women, and
Pornographers,19 Phil & Pub Aff 311, 335-36 (1990) (interpreting MacKinnon's argument).
MacKinnon's own position on this is complex. Subordination is her principal target, not
simply violence; but I think that violence or coercion in some form underlies much of the
argument and almost all of her examples. See MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified at 32-45,
166-95.
28 See MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified at 175-95, 200-05.
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gal standards, that they have been harmed by the use of pornography to stimulate sex crimes. 29 In both cases, the usual remedy
would be an award of monetary damages for actual harm. In some
circumstances, a victim might also seek an injunction to prevent
continued distribution or use of harmful material. For example, a
woman forced to participate in a pornographic movie might be permitted to enjoin further sale of the movie.
Under this approach, the category of regulable speech might
be relatively broad or extremely narrow. We might, for example,
adopt the basic approach but decide to ensure protection for all
material with serious social value. We might also refuse to regulate
speech unless it has little real cognitive content. Or we might seek
to regulate a subcategory of obscenity defined in terms of harms to
women. In any case, the category of regulable speech could prove
to be much smaller than the category now subject to regulation
under the antiobscenity approach. This important point is often
missed. The real difference between this approach and the current
focus on obscenity 0 lies not in greater breadth of coverage but in
its emphasis on discrimination and harm to women rather than offense or contemporary community standards.3 1
How is the First Amendment issue affected if women injured
by pornography are given a civil action and if criminal prosecutors
have no enforcement authority? In some ways, the civil action
helps alleviate the First Amendment concerns. There is a special
problem whenever the government proceeds against speech that it
deems harmful, and a private suit does not pose this problem. In
particular, there might seem to be no free speech problem if a
woman injured in the production of pornography brings suit to recover damages for the harms done to her.32 On the other hand, the
2' See Marianne Wesson, Girls Should Bring Lawsuits Everywhere... Nothing Will
be Corrupted: Pornography as Speech and Product, 60 U Chi L Rev 845 (1993) (in this
issue).
30 See Miller v California,413 US 15 (1973). The Miller standard defines obscenity as
material that (a) under contemporary community standards appeals to the prurient interest;
(b) "depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by
the applicable state law"; and (c) taken as a whole "lacks serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value." Id at 24.
31 See Elena Kagan, Regulation of Hate Speech and PornographyAfter R.A.V., 60 U
Chi L Rev 873, 878-79 (1993) (in this issue).
11 To be sure, it is sometimes the case that the state cannot punish speech that is produced through illegality; it may punish the illegality but not the publication. See New York
Times v United States, 403 US 713, 730-40 (1971) (White concurring) ("Pentagon Papers"
case). This idea makes most sense when (a) the speech is high-value; (b) the punishment of
the illegality should provide sufficient deterrence, that is, there are no special reasons to
think that a ban on publication is a necessary adjunct to the criminal law; or (c) both.
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state is unquestionably involved when it awards damages for
harms done by speech, and we know from New York Times v Sullivan 3 that the First Amendment imposes barriers to government
efforts to force speakers to pay for the real costs that their speech
produces. The parallel to New York Times is very close if the government says that anyone who produces art and literature must
pay for injuries that result from his work. The question is not limited to material containing sexual violence. Dostoevsky's Crime
and Punishment is said to have been followed by a series of copycat murders in Russia.
Serious constitutional problems would arise if government
were to say that all speakers must pay the victims to restore losses
from any crimes proximately resulting from their speech. First, any
judge or jury decision about causation might well be unreliable,
suspect, or affected by bias of various sorts. Second, the actor, not
the speaker, should normally bear the burden for harm, at least
34
when the normal First Amendment standards have not been met.
(This concern does not arise when the actor is the speaker.) And at
least if we are talking about speech that is genuinely in the First
Amendment core, New York Times seems to say that government
may not require speakers to "internalize" the costs of what they
say. 35 The Court's rationale is that cost-internalization will impose
an excessive chilling effect on valuable speech.3 6 It is possible to
question this view,3 7 but it seems to be the law, and so long as it is,
a civil action for harms that result from speech is not fundamentally different from criminal prosecution. Aside from the case of a
damage remedy for harms to participants in pornography, as to
which the free speech concerns seem minimal, 38 I will therefore
proceed on the assumption that as far as the First Amendment is
concerned, the civil and criminal remedies stand on the same basic
ground. The assumption may not be accurate insofar as we are
dealing with speech far afield from the free speech core. But I will
put this point to one side.

33 376 US 254, 267-83 (1964).

3, See Brandenburg v Ohio, 395 US 444 (1969) (articulating the current standard for
punishing speech that constitutes "seditious advocacy").
35 376 US at 267-83.
36 Id.
37 See Frederick Schauer, Uncoupling Free Speech, 92 Colum L Rev 1321 (1992) (discussing non-speech-chilling methods of compensating victims of speech-related harms).
38 See note 32 and accompanying text.
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Antipornography vs. antiobscenity.

It is often suggested that the antipornography position raises
especially serious free speech questions and that the antiobscenity
and "no regulation" positions are far preferable. 9 In fact, however,
there is a quite straightforward argument for regulating at least
some narrowly defined class of pornographic materials. The first
point, made by traditional obscenity law as well, is that much pornographic material lies far from the center of First Amendment
concern.4 ° Under current doctrine, and under any sensible system
of free expression, speech that lies at the periphery of constitutional concern may be regulated on a lesser showing of harm than
speech that lies at the core.
To be sure, it is not simple to define the core and the periphery. Debates over that issue are a staple of First Amendment controversy.4 1 Familiar organizing theories look to whether the speech
at issue is connected with the exchange of ideas,4 or is intended
and received as a contribution to social deliberation about some
issue.4" This latter position, with roots in James Madison, seems to
me most plausible,4 but under nearly any standard, at least some
pornographic materials will be easily classified in the free speech
periphery. Such materials fall in the same category as misleading
commercial speech, libel of private persons, conspiracies, unlicensed medical or legal advice, bribes, perjury, threats, and so
forth. These forms of speech do not appeal to deliberative capacities about public matters, or about matters at all-even if this category is construed quite broadly, as it should be, and even if we
insist, as we should, that emotive and cognitive capacities are frequently intertwined in deliberative processes and that any sharp
split between "emotion" and "cognition" would be untrue to political discussion. Many forms of pornography are not an appeal to
3' See, for example, Ronald Dworkin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in Edna Ullmann-Margalit and Avishai Margalit, eds, Isaiah Berlin: A Celebration 100, 103-09 (Chicago, 1991).
4' See Miller, 413 US at 34-36.
41 See, for example, Frederick Schauer, Free Speech: A PhilosophicalInquiry (Cambridge, 1982); Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U Pa L Rev 591 (1982);
Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 Phil & Pub Aff 204 (1972); T.M.
Scanlon, Jr., Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression, 40 U Pitt L Rev 519
(1979).
0' See Abrams v United States, 250 US 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes dissenting); Richard A.
Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 27.1 at 665 (Little, Brown, 4th ed 1992).
43 This is an attempted description of the political conception defended in Alexander
Meiklejohn, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government (Harper, 1948).
11 I defend this position in depth in Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free
Expression ch 5 (cited in note 22).
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the exchange of ideas, political or otherwise; they operate as masturbatory aids and do not qualify for top-tier
First Amendment
45
protection under the prevailing theories.
An important qualification is necessary here. Those who write
or read sexually explicit material can often claim important expressive and deliberative interests. 46 Sexually explicit works can be
highly relevant to the development of individual capacities. For
many, they are important vehicles for self-discovery and self-definition.41 In light of the complexity of sexuality, the same might be
said of some of the most graphic forms of sexually explicit material, even if they feature violence. Perhaps such speech is not intended and received as a contribution to democratic debate. But
the development of individual capacities is instrumental to democratic characteristics, 4s and in any case it might be urged that the
presence of expressive and deliberative interests qualifies material
for treatment as within the free speech core.
In this space I cannot fully evaluate this view. No one has set
out an approach to free speech value based on expressive and deliberative value. Such an approach would, however, have a questionable historical pedigree. Wherever it may stand in philosophy,
it appears to be something of a newcomer to our constitutional tradition. Moreover, it does not connect well with an understanding
of when government's motives are least likely to be trustworthy.4 9
In any case, the approach appears to fit poorly with both existing
law and ordinary convictions about particular cases. For example,
child pornography and scientific speech might well be able to claim
expressive and deliberative interests, and it seems hard to claim

'5 To be sure, pornography is political in the sense that it has political consequences.
But this does not mean that it is political in the First Amendment sense of that word. Much
speech that does not belong in the top tier-misleading commercial speech, attempted bribery of public officials-has political consequences. If speech qualifies for the top tier whenever it has such consequences, almost all speech would so qualify, and First Amendment
doctrine would be made senseless. Instead, the test is whether it is intended and received as
a contribution to democratic deliberation-and much pornography fails that test. It is true
that the recent attack on pornography has drawn attention to its political character, but this
fact does not undermine the First Amendment argument, since the First Amendment conception of "the political" is properly and importantly different from the conception of "the
political" in popular discussion.
4' See Joshua Cohen, Freedom of Expression, 23 Phil & Pub Aff (forthcoming, 1993).
47 See Robin West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological
Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 Wis Women's L J 81, 116-33 (1987).
4' As Meiklejohn urged in his extended conception of the political. See Alexander
Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is An Absolute, 1961 S Ct Rev 245.
49 I discuss the relevance of these concerns in Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of
Free Expression ch 5 (cited in note 22).
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that they belong in the free speech core. If they did, they could not
be regulable in light of the stringent standards applied to material
within the core. To be sure, such materials are associated with
harm; but for material in the core, the proper approach would be
to attack the offending conduct directly rather than the speech,
and to allow the speech so long as the Brandenburg v Ohio50 standard has not been met. These considerations suggest that material
ought not to belong in the free speech core, or in any top tier of
protection, by virtue of its connection with deliberative and expressive interests, even if it is assumed that pornography is wellconnected with those interests.
I do not claim that expressive and deliberative interests are
irrelevant. When they are at stake, the material at issue is entitled
to at least a degree of constitutional protection. It cannot be
banned or controlled without a showing of genuine harm-much
like commercial speech, private libel, and scientific speech. But because at least some sexually explicit material is far from the center
of constitutional concern, it can be regulated on the basis of a
lesser showing of harm.
Pornographic material causes sufficient harms to justify regulation under the more lenient standards applied to speech that
does not fit within the free speech core. Of course it is possible to
question the extent of the relevant harms; the empirical debates
are complex, and I will only summarize some of the evidence here.
But the harms do create a far stronger case for regulation than
underlies the antiobscenity position, which relies on less tangible
aesthetic goals and on the more vague idea of adherence to conventional moral standards. Notably, the relevant harms consist of acts
committed against women by men. The category of regulable
speech would therefore less plausibly include homosexual pornography, for which the same showing of harm cannot be made (so far
as I am aware).
The harms fall in three categories. 1 First, the existence of the
pornography market produces a number of harms to models and
actresses. 5 2 Many women, usually very young, are coerced into pornography. Others are abused and mistreated, often in grotesque
ways, once they enter the pornography "market." To be sure, most

50 395 US 444 (1969).
"1 The following argument draws upon Cass R. Sunstein, Pornographyand the First
Amendment, 1986 Duke L J 589, 591-602.

"' See the summary in US Department of Justice, Attorney General's Commission on
Pornography, 1 FinalReport 888-89 (US GPO 1986).
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women who participate are not so abused. It is therefore tempting
to respond that government should adopt a less restrictive alternative. Rather than regulating the speech, government should ban
the coercion or mistreatment, as indeed current state law does.
Usually this strategy is indeed better and even constitutionally required. 3 But in this peculiar setting, such an alternative would be
a recipe for disaster, because it would simply allow existing practices to continue. The enforcement problems are so difficult that
restrictions on the material are necessary to supplement the criminal ban. 4
Second, it is reasonable to think that there is a causal connection between pornography and violence against women. 5 The extent of the effect and the precise relationship between exposure to
pornographic and sexual violence are sharply disputed. No one
suggests that sexual violence would disappear if pornography were
eliminated, or that most consumers of violent pornography act out
what they see or read. But a review of the literature suggests a
reasonable legislature could conclude that pornography does increase the incidence of sexual violence against women. The evidence includes laboratory experiments, longitudinal studies of the
effects of increased availability of pornography, and victim and po-

53 It is by no means clear that government can ban speech merely because there is
illegality in its production or acquisition. See New York Times v United States, 403 US 713
(1971) (allowing publication of material that was acquired unlawfully). Especially when the
material belongs in the free speech top tier, the proper remedy is to prevent the illegality
rather than to prevent the publication, at least if the Brandenburg standard cannot be met.
In most cases, government should be required to proceed against the offending conduct. But
in the context of pornography, these strictures should not apply. By hypothesis, the material
is not in the top tier, and for reasons stated in the text, it seems inadequate to require the
government to proceed against the conduct.
The Court recognized this point in the context of child pornography in New York v
Ferber, 458 US 747, 759-61 (1982).
" See generally Edward Donnerstein, Daniel Linz, and Steven Penrod, The Question of
Pornography:Research Findings and Policy Implications 86-107 (Free Press, 1987); Mary
R. Murrin and D.R. Laws, The Influence of Pornographyon Sex Crimes, in W.L. Marshall,
D.R. Laws, and H.E. Barbaree, eds, Handbook of Sexual Assault: Issues, Theories, and
Treatment of the Offender 73 (Plenum, 1990); Edward Donnerstein, Pornography:Its Effect on Violence Against Women, in Neil M. Malamuth and Edward Donnerstein, eds, Pornography and Sexual Aggression 53 (Academic Press, 1984); Attorney General's Commission on Pornography, 1 Final Report at 888-89. On the problem of causation, see Frederick
Schauer, Causation Theory and the Causes of Sexual Violence, 1987 Am Bar Found Res J
737.
" See Donnerstein, Linz, and Penrod, The Question of Pornographyat 172; Anthony
D'Amato, A New Political Truth: Exposure to Sexually Violent Materials Causes Sexual
Violence, 31 Wm & Mary L Rev 575 (1990); Robert C. Post, Cultural Heterogeneity and
Law: Pornography,Blasphemy, and the FirstAmendment, 76 Cal L Rev 297, 325-26 (1988).
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lice testimony.5 7 All three sources indicate a plausible connection
between exposure to sexually violent material and sexually violent
acts.
Evidence of this kind presents severe methodological
problems. Laboratory experiments may inadequately connect to
the real world, longitudinal studies cannot easily control for other
variables, and victim and police testimony is anecdotal. Even if
there were a close causal connection between pornography and
real-world violence, social science would have a hard time proving
it. But the current evidence is sufficiently suggestive to indicate
that the real question is not the existence of a causal connection
but its degree. In light of current information, it would be reasonable for a legislature to think that there would be genuine benefits
from regulation of violent pornography.
These first two arguments-harm to participants and a causal
connection with violent acts-suggest that antipornography legislation should be addressed only to movies and pictures, and not the
written word. Of course it is only in movies and pictures that abuse
of participants will occur. (One might similarly support a law
against child pornography in movies and print while allowing written essays that amount to child pornography.) Moreover, the evidence on pornography as a stimulus to violence deals mostly with
movies and pictures, and the immediacy and vividness of these media suggest a possible distinction from written texts. I do not discuss the exact breadth of an antipornography statute here. But the
possibility of exempting written texts, no matter what they contain, suggests the weakness of the objection from neutrality: a statute that exempts written texts is very plausibly treated as harmbased rather than viewpoint-based. 58
The third and most general point is that pornography promotes degrading and dehumanizing behavior toward women. Significantly, this behavior includes a variety of forms of illegal conduct, prominent among them sexual harassment. The pornography
industry operates as a conditioning factor for some men and
women, a factor that has consequences for equality between men
and women. These conditioning effects are associated with harmful
consequences for self-respect. Of course, pornography is more
symptom than cause; but it is cause as well. One need not believe

57 Two reviews, reaching different conclusions, can be found in Richard A. Posner, Sex
and Reason 366-74 (Harvard, 1992); and Sunstein, 1986 Duke L J at 597-601 (cited in note
51).
" See Section Ill.A.
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that the elimination of pornography would bring about sexual
equality, eliminate sexual violence, or change social attitudes in
any fundamental way in order to agree that a regulatory effort
could reduce violence and diminish views that contribute to existing inequalities.
Invoking the injury to self-respect, a common argument holds
that this dehumanizing behavior has the effect of "silencing"
women: making them believe that their opinions are of less importance, will be ignored, will meet social sanctions, or worse. 59 It is
surely reasonable to think that such silencing occurs. But hard
questions are raised by the claim that the argument from "silencing" properly plays a significant role in the First Amendment inquiry. This form of silencing is produced by social attitudes resulting from speech itself, and perhaps one cannot find that to be a
reason for regulation without making excessive inroads on a system
of free expression. Many forms of speech do indeed have silencing
effects, and this is not a sufficient reason to regulate them.6 0 There
are two problems here. First, it is uncertain whether the form of
silencing that results from speech itself should be, in principle, a
basis for regulating speech. Certainly in general it seems right to
say that people intimidated by the speech of others should learn
not to be intimidated, rather than receive a right to silence intimidating speech. 1 Second, even if we resolve the question of principle in favor of the "silencing" argument, government institutions
are peculiarly unlikely to be able to make reliable judgments on
this issue. It is plausible to think that would-be speakers are often
silenced by especially vigorous challenges, and government regulation of those challenges, based on "silencing," might well be rooted
in objectionable motivations and untrustworthy conclusions. Much
remains to be done on this difficult subject. But in the area of pornography regulation, it seems best to avoid the most controversial
and adventurous claims, and so I will not rely on the silencing argument here.
Taken as a whole, these considerations suggest a quite conventional argument for regulation of pornography, one that fits well
with the rest of free speech law. For example, misleading commercial speech is regulable because it is not entitled to the highest

5 See MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified at 181, 188-89 (cited in note 24).
10 See Dworkin, Two Concepts of Liberty at 107-09 (cited in note 39).
61 Under some narrow circumstances, this conclusion may not hold. The university setting is a possible example in that certain sorts of abusive faculty speech may silence student
speech.
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form of protection and because the harms produced by such
speech are sufficient to allow for regulation. The same is true of
libel of private persons, criminal solicitation, unlicensed legal or
medical advice, and conspiracy. Certain forms of pornography
should be approached similarly. Indeed, the argument for regulation-in view of the nature of the material and the evidence of
harm-seems more powerful than the corresponding argument for
many forms of speech now subject to government control. Thus
far, then, the hard issues have to do with the appropriate breadth
and clarity of any prohibition, not with the basic approach.
Hate Speech

B.

Hate speech raises quite different issues from pornography.
Hate speech is often part and parcel of public debate on certain
questions; pornography is not. Many forms of pornography are far
from the center of constitutional concern; nothing of this sort can
be said for the many kinds of hate speech that are designed and
received as judgments about certain social questions. If restrictions
on hate speech cover not merely epithets but also speech that is
part of social deliberation, they appear overbroad and unconstitutional for that very reason.6 2 Speech that is intended and received
as a contribution to social deliberation is constitutionally protected
even if it amounts to hate speech-even if it is racist and sexist.
In a famous case, Justice Frankfurter, speaking for a 5-4 majority, seemed to reject this view. Beauharnais v Illinois3 upheld
an Illinois law making it unlawful to publish or exhibit any publication that "portrays depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of
virtue of a class of citizens, which [publication] exposes the citizens
of any race, color, creed or religion to contempt, derision, or obloquy or which is productive of breach of the peace or riots. 6 4 The
law was applied to ban circulation of a petition urging "the need to
prevent the white race from becoming mongrelized by the negro,"
rapes, robberies, knives, guns
and complaining of the "aggressions,
65
and marijuana of the negro.

"

Doe v University of Michigan, 721 F Supp 852, 864-66 (E D Mich 1989) (invalidating

university hate speech regulation); UWM Post, Inc. v Board of Regents of the University of
Wisconsin, 774 F Supp 1163, 1172-78 (E D Wis 1991) (same).
6- 343 US 250 (1952).
14 Id at 251, quoting Ill Rev Stat ch 38(1) § 471
(1949), codified at Ill Crim Code
§ 224a (1979).
65 343 US at 252.
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In upholding the law, Justice Frankfurter referred to the historical exclusion of libel from free speech protection, to the risks to
social cohesion created by racial hate speech, and to the need for
judicial deference to legislative judgments on these complex matters. 66 Many countries in Europe accept the same analysis and do
not afford protection to racial and ethnic hate speech. 7 But most
people think that after New York Times v Sullivan, Beauharnais
is no longer the law. 8 In New York Times, the Court indicated
that the law of libel must be evaluated in accordance with the constitutional commitment to robust debate on public issues. 9 The
conventional view-which the Supreme Court has not directly addressed-is that racial hate speech contains highly political ideas,
and that it may not be suppressed merely because it is offensive or
otherwise harmful.
There are real complexities here. In its strongest form, the defense of Beauharnaiswould point not only to Justice Frankfurter's
argument, but also to the contribution of hate speech to the maintenance of a caste system based on race. A principal point here
would be the effect of such speech on the self-respect of its victims
and its relationship to fears of racially-motivated violence.70 I cannot fully discuss this issue here, but I think that the conventional
view on the matter is probably correct.7 1 No one should deny that
distinctive subjective and objective harms are produced by racial
hate speech, especially when it is directed against members of minority groups. It is only obtuseness-a failure of perception or empathetic identification-that would enable someone to say that the
word "fascist" or "pig" produces the same feelings as the word
"nigger." In view of our history, invective directed against minority
groups, and racist speech in general, creates fears of violence and
subordination that are not plausibly described as mere offense. It
might be added that some forms of hate speech amount to a denial
of the premise of political equality that is central to a well-func66Id at 254-66.
17 See, for example, Public Order Act of 1986 § 23 (United Kingdom);
Strafgesetzbuch
[STGB] § 131 (Federal Republic of Germany).
es See, for example, Collin v Smith, 578 F2d 1197, 1204 (7th Cir 1978) (questioning
whether "Beauharnaiswould pass constitutional muster today").
69376 US at 270.
'0 See Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech
on Campus, 1990 Duke L J 431, 457-76; Marl Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech,
87 Mich L Rev 2320, 2320-41 (1989); Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action
for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name Calling, 17 Harv CR-CL L Rev 133, 135-49 (1982).
"1 For a more detailed description, see Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free
Expression ch 6 (cited in note 22).
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tioning democracy. In this light, there is nothing obvious about the
view that the law should be banned from guarding against speech
that causes racial hatred. As noted above, most European countries, including flourishing democracies committed to free speech,
make exceptions for such expression. In many countries, including
our own, it is possible to think that racial and ethnic hate speech is
really sui generis, and that it is properly treated differently from
other forms of political speech.
On the other hand, a good deal of public debate involves racial
or religious bigotry or even hatred, implicit or explicit. If we were
to excise all such speech from political debate, we would severely
curtail our discussion of such important matters as civil rights, foreign policy, crime, conscription, abortion, and social welfare policy.
Even if a form of hate speech is involved, it might well be thought
a legitimate part of the deliberative process-it bears directly on
politics. Foreclosure of such speech would probably accomplish little good, and by stopping people from hearing certain ideas, it
could bring about a great deal of harm. These are the most conven72
tional Millian arguments for the protection of speech.
These general propositions do not resolve all of the questions
raised by restrictions on hate speech, but they do suggest that distinctions must be drawn between different forms of speech that
fall within the category. It seems to follow that many imaginable
restrictions on hate speech cut too broadly. Consider, for example,
the University of Michigan's judicially invalidated ban on "[a]ny
behavior, verbal or physical, that stigmatizes or victimizes an individual on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orientation, creed, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status, handicap,
or Vietnam-era veteran status, and that . . . [c]reates an intimidating, hostile, or demeaning environment for educational pursuits
....
,,73This sort of broad ban forbids a wide range of statements
that are part of the exchange of ideas. It also fails to give people
sufficient notice of what statements are allowed. For both reasons,
it should be invalidated.
But some restrictions on hate speech do not run afoul of these
principles. For example, Stanford now forbids speech that amounts
to "harassment by personal vilification. ' 74 (Stanford is a private

7 See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, reprinted in John M. Robson, ed, 18 Collected
Works of John Stuart Mill 213, 257-58 (Toronto, 1984).
" Quoted in Doe, 721 F Supp at 856.
7 See Thomas C. Grey, Civil Rights vs. Civil Liberties, in Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred
D.
Miller, Jr., and Jeffrey Paul, eds, Reassessing Civil Rights 81, 106 (Blackwell, 1991).
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university, free from constitutional restraint; but it has chosen to
comply with its understanding of what the First Amendment
means as applied to public universities.) 7 5 Under the Stanford rule,
speech qualifies as regulable "harassment" if it:
(a) is intended to insult or stigmatize an individual or a small
number of individuals on the basis of their sex, race, color,
handicap, religion, sexual orientation, or national and ethnic
origin; and (b) is addressed directly to the individual or individuals whom it insults or stigmatizes; and (c) makes use of
insulting or "fighting" words or nonverbal symbols. 6
To qualify under (c), the speech must by its "very utterance inflict
injury or tend to incite to an immediate breach of the peace," and
must be "commonly understood to convey direct and visceral hatred or contempt for human beings on the basis of" one of the
grounds enumerated in (b).7
The Stanford regulation should not be faulted for excessive
breadth. It is quite narrowly defined. Unlike the Michigan rule, it
does not reach far beyond epithets to forbid the expression of
views on public issues. On an analogy to the obscene telephone
call, which is without constitutional protection 7 8 official restrictions of the sort represented by the Stanford regulation should not
be invalidated under the First Amendment. If this general approach is correct, the problem of hate speech should turn on
whether the speech at issue plausibly qualifies as a contribution to
the exchange of ideas. 9 If it does not, it can be regulated on the
basis of the relevant showing of harm.

III. NEUTRALITY
I have not yet discussed the issue of selectivity. The Supreme
Court has made clear that discrimination on the basis of viewpoint
lies at the heart of the free speech prohibition.8 0 For example, the
government may not draw lines between libel of conservatives and
Id

at 90-105.

76 Id at 106.
77 Id at 107.
71 Sable Communications of California v FCC, 492 US 115, 124 (1989) (making a dis-

tinction between obscene phone calls, which are unprotected under the Miller test, and
phone calls that are merely indecent and hence protected by the First Amendment).
79 I suggest below somewhat broader authority in education. See Section HI.C.
80 See, for example, Texas v Johnson, 491 US 397, 414 (1989); United States v Eichman, 496 US 310, 317-19 (1990); PerryEducation Ass'n v Perry Local Educators'Ass'n, 460
US 37, 62 (1983) (Brennan dissenting).
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libel of liberals-even if the relevant libel is generally without constitutional protection. Similarly, the government could not impose
special penalties on fighting words directed against Republicans.
Under current law, the prohibition on selectivity is fatal to
many possible restrictions on pornography and hate speech. I
think that the principle is unobjectionable-indeed, it is extremely
salutary. But the principle should not be used, as it now is, to
doom narrowly drawn regulation of pornography and hate speech.
A. Pornography
The antipornography position remains poorly represented not
only in popular debate but also in current constitutional law.
Above all, the position is said to run afoul of the prohibition on
viewpoint discrimination. I suggest that part of what has made the
antipornography approach so controversial is that it is rooted in a
belief that there is something like a caste system based on gender-that women are treated unequally to men, that the sexual
and reproductive status quo, as between men and women, is itself
sometimes a place for inequality, that sexual violence by men
against women is a greater social problem than sexual violence by
women against men, and that social inequality can be both expressed and perpetuated through sexuality. The rejection of these
propositions-a refusal to recognize existing inequality, transmuted into a claim of partiality-has proved to be critical for constitutional law. The objection here is that the antipornography position is selective (especially compared with the antiobscenity
approach), and that in its selectivity lies its partisanship, which is
what makes it fatally inferior to its competitors.
In the leading decision on the subject, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in a case affirmed summarily
by the Supreme Court, invalidated an antipornography ordinance."' The court reasoned that an argument that would allow
regulation of pornographic materials by reference to the harms referred to above is worse, not better, than the obscenity approach.
Indeed, it would be worse than the obscenity approach even if the
category of speech suppressed turned out to be far narrower than
the category that can be suppressed under existing law. According
to the court's reasoning, any statute that imposed penalties on a

8' American Booksellers Ass'n v Hudnut, 771 F2d 323 (7th Cir 1985), aff'd mem, 475
US 1001 (1986).
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subcategory of obscene speech, defined by reference to these
harms, would be unconstitutional. s2
For the court, the key point is that such an approach would
constitute impermissible "thought control," since it would "establish[ ] an 'approved' view of women, of how they may react to sexual encounters, [and] of how the sexes may relate to each other."8' 3
Under the antipornography approach, depictions of sexuality that
involve rape and violence against women may be subject to regulation, whereas depictions that do not are uncontrolled. It is the nonneutrality of antipornography legislation-its focus on violence
against women-that is its central defect. People with the approved view can speak; people with the disapproved view cannot.
That, in the court's view, is what the First Amendment centrally
prohibits.8 4
The general point seems correct; the prohibition on viewpoint
discrimination does lie at the heart of the free speech guarantee.8 5
But especially in this setting, the category of viewpoint neutrality
proves far more difficult to understand than it appears at first
glance. First Amendment law contains several categories of speech
that are subject to ban or regulation even though they are nonneutral in very much the same sense as antipornography legislation. Imagine, for example, that government bans advertising in
favor of gambling at casinos. This restriction seems viewpointbased. Such bans do not simultaneously prohibit advertising aimed
against gambling. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has upheld this
unquestionably viewpoint-based restriction. 6

82

Id at 330-32.

83 Id at 328.

Id at 328-32.
See Stone, 25 Wm & Mary L Rev at 198 (cited in note 1).
96 Posadas v Tourism Co. of PuertoRico, 478 US 328 (1986). Perhaps it would be possible to argue that the restriction is not really viewpoint-based, because there is no real category called "advertisements against gambling." Speech of that kind is really a public-interest announcement. Real viewpoint discrimination would consist of a ban on "pro-gambling"
messages, which are not banned. The prohibition on advertisements for casino gambling
does not prevent people from advertising their view that gambling is a good idea. On this
view, the ban on casino gambling-and the other examples offered in the text-are not real
examples of viewpoint discrimination.
I do not believe that this is a persuasive response. It amounts to a reshuffling of the
categories, and does not come to terms with the real discrimination in the examples. People
cannot buy advertising time or space to stimulate demand for certain activities, whereas
people can do precisely this in order to dampen demand for those activities.
8

85
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Courts have also upheld restrictions on cigarette or liquor advertising on television 87-even though there are no restrictions on
the plentiful advertising aimed against the smoking of cigarettes or
the drinking of liquor. These restrictions constitute another example of acceptable viewpoint discrimination. Perhaps the most vivid
illustration of such discrimination is the ban on advertising of un8 I cannot sell
lawful products or activities.1
an advertisement for
cocaine or heroin, even though the government permits and even
encourages advertisements designed to stop the use of drugs.
There is unambiguous viewpoint discrimination in this state of
affairs.
Most people agree that these kinds of regulation present no
constitutional problem. The reason is that the restriction is based
on such obvious harms that the notion that it is viewpoint-based
does not even register. Casino gambling, cigarette smoking, drinking, and use of illegal drugs all pose obvious risks to both self and
others. Governmental controls on advertising for these activities
are a means of controlling these risks.
Or consider, as another example of viewpoint discrimination,
the area of labor law, where courts have held that government may
ban employers from speaking unfavorably about the effects of
unionization in the period before a union election if the unfavorable statements might be interpreted as a threat against workers
who support unionization. 9 Regulation of such speech is plausibly
a form of discrimination on the basis of viewpoint, because it does
not proscribe employer speech favorable to unionization. As a final
example, consider the securities laws, which regulate speech in
proxy statements. Restrictions on viewpoint can be found here,
too. Favorable views toward a company's prospects are banned,
while unfavorable views are permitted and perhaps even
encouraged. 9°

sI See Oklahoma Telecasters Ass'n v Crisp, 699 F2d 490 (10th Cir 1983), rev'd on other
grounds, Capital Cities Cable v Crisp, 467 US 691 (1984) (alcohol); Dunagin v City of Oxford, 718 F2d 738 (5th Cir 1983) (alcohol); Capital City Broadcasting Co. v Mitchell, 333 F
Supp 582 (D DC 1971) (three-judge court), aff'd mem, 405 US 1000 (1972) (cigarettes).
" See Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
US 748, 772 (1976).
89 See NLRB v Gissel Packing Co., 395 US 575, 618-20 (1969).
S0 Compare 17 CFR § 240.14a-9 (1992) (prohibiting false or misleading statements in
proxy statements and offering as an example "predictions of specific future market values");
and 15 USC § 78n(e) (1988) (prohibiting untrue statements of fact or omissions of material
facts in proxy statements); with Regulation S-K § 503, codified in 17 CFR § 229.503 (1992)
(requiring disclosure of high-risk factors in a prospectus).
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We should conclude from all this that there is no per se barrier to viewpoint discrimination. Laws that silence one side in a
debate are given a strong presumption of invalidity, but the presumption can be overcome in certain narrow circumstances. Those
circumstances appear to occur when there is no serious risk of illegitimate government motivation, when low-value or unprotected
speech is at issue, when the skewing effect on the system of free
expression is minimal, and when the government is able to make a
powerful showing that it is responding to genuine harm. When
these requirements are met, the partisanship of the regulation is
not apparent because there is so firm a consensus on the presence
of real-world harms that the objection from neutrality does not
even register. The spectre of partisanship does not arise because a
decision to control the speech in question has obvious legitimate
justifications, and an extension of the prohibition to other areas
appears not compelled by neutrality but instead to be an unnecessary form of censorship.
The point suggests that the Hudnut court proceeded to its
conclusion too quickly; it should have investigated the many cases
in which apparent viewpoint discrimination is acceptable. Indeed,
the current law of obscenity might readily be regarded as non-neutral. Along some dimensions, antiobscenity law is not a bit less partisan than antipornography legislation. The line drawn by existing
law makes it critical whether the speech in question is prurient
and patently offensive by reference to contemporary community
standards.9 1 But if contemporary community standards are, with
respect to offensiveness and prurience, themselves partisan and reflective of a particular viewpoint (and it would be most surprising
if they were not), then a decision to make contemporary standards
the basis for regulation is impermissibly partisan. (Imagine if the
government said that contemporary community standards would
be the basis for regulating depictions of race relations.) On what
theory, then, can antiobscenity law be treated as neutral and antipornography law as impermissibly partisan?
I suggest that the answer lies in the fact that antiobscenity law
takes existing social consensus as the foundation for decision,
whereas antipornography law is directed against that consensus.
Existing practice is the target of the antipornography approach, or
what that approach seeks to change; existing practice is the very
basis of the antiobscenity approach, or what that approach seeks

91

Miller v California, 413 US 15, 24 (1973).
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to preserve. Obscenity law, insofar as it depends on community
standards, is deemed neutral only because the class of prohibited
speech is defined by reference to existing social values. Antipornography legislation is deemed impermissibly partisan because
the prohibited class of speech is defined by less widely accepted
ideas about equality between men and women-more precisely, by
reference to a belief that equality does not always exist even in the,
private realm, that sexual violence by men against women is a
greater problem than sexual violence by women against men, and
that the sexual status quo is an ingredient in sexual inequality.
Along the axis of neutrality, however, there is no sharp distinction between antiobscenity and antipornography law. That distinction would be plausible only if existing norms and practices
themselves embodied equality. Because they do not, the distinction
fails. Indeed, one could imagine a society in which the harms produced by pornography were so widely acknowledged and so generally condemned that an antipornography ordinance would not be
regarded as viewpoint-based at all but instead as a perfectly natural response to harm-much as the Supreme Court now views the
92
ban on child pornography.
I conclude that the argument for regulating materials that
combine sex with violence is more powerful than the corresponding
argument for regulating obscenity. Since perfectly conventional
measures regulating speech are similarly partisan and have properly been upheld, the objection from non-neutrality is unpersuasive here as well. More particularly, the standards for accepting
laws that contain viewpoint discrimination seem to be met here.
There are sufficient justifications based on tangible harms. By hypothesis, the regulated speech is low-value under any plausible approach to valuation under the First Amendment.
Moreover, it is not impermissibly selective to aim at material
that contains and promotes violence against women. This is so especially in light of the Constitution's commitment to the elimination of caste, a commitment that is violated by disproportionate
violence against any social group defined in terms of a morally irrelevant characteristic. It should be recalled here that the Equal
Protection Clause was originally conceived as an effort to counteract the disproportionate subjection of black people to private and
public violence. An effort to counteract the disproportionate subjection of women to such violence is very much in keeping with the

" New York v Ferber,458 US 747, 756-61 (1982).
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aspirations of the Equal Protection Clause. Such an effort should
not be deemed inconsistent with neutrality.
I do not claim that it will be easy to design regulations with
sufficient clarity and narrowness. But it is those questions that we
should be addressing, not the question of neutrality. So long as any
emerging law has the requisite clarity and narrow scope, the appropriate forum for deliberation on this contested subject is the democratic process, not the judiciary. The Constitution should not bar a
narrowly defined prohibition on material that combines sex with
violence against women.
A final note. Nothing I have said here argues in favor of regulation of sexually explicit material in general, or, to take an important and revealing example, of the work of Robert Mapplethorpe,
an artist who was recently subject to criminal prosecution for his
art depicting, among other things, homosexual relations.9 3 As I
have understood it here, the antipornography argument is quite
specific in its aims. It is not directed against sexually explicit material as a whole. The antipornography argument, rightly understood, calls for strong protection of speech that complains explicitly or implicitly about discrimination against homosexuals,
because that speech is "high value" in the relevant sense and because it contains few or none of the harms that call for regulation
of pornography.
B.

Hate Speech

Are restrictions on hate speech impermissibly selective? In
R.A.V. v City of St. Paul,9' the Court invalidated a law directed
against a certain kind of hate speech, principally on the ground
that it discriminated on the basis of subject matter. As interpreted
by the Minnesota Supreme Court, the relevant law banned any
fighting words that produced anger or resentment on the basis of
race, religion, or gender." The R.A.V. Court emphasized that the
law at issue was not a broad or general proscription of fighting
words. 96 Instead, the law reflected a decision to single out a certain
category of "fighting words," defined in terms of audience reactions to speech about certain topics.9 7 Is this constitutionally ille-

"' See City of Cincinnativ ContemporaryArts Center, 57 Ohio Misc 2d 9, 566 NE2d
207 (1990).
112 S Ct 2538 (1992).
Id at 2541.
08

Id at 2547-48.

97

Id.
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gitimate? The point bears on almost all efforts to regulate hate
speech.8
Subject matter restrictions are not all the same. We can imagine subject matter restrictions that are questionable ("no one may
discuss homosexuality on the subway") and subject matter restrictions that seem legitimate ("no high-level CIA employee may
speak publicly about classified matters relating to the clandestine
affairs of the American government."9 ) As a class, subject matter
restrictions appear to occupy a point somewhere between viewpoint-based restrictions and content-neutral ones. Sometimes
courts uphold such restrictions as a form of permissible content
regulation. For example, the Court has permitted prohibitions of
political advertising on buses 0 0 and of partisan political speech at
army bases. 10 1 These cases show that there is no per se ban on subject matter restrictions. When the Court upholds subject matter
restrictions, it is either because the line drawn by government
gives no real reason for fear about lurking viewpoint discrimination, or (what is close to the same thing) because government is
able to invoke neutral, harm-based justifications for treating certain subjects differently from others. In raising this issue, hate
speech restrictions pose many of the same problems discussed
above in connection with pornography.
If the subject matter restriction in the cross-burning case is
acceptable, it must be because the specified catalogue of regulated
speech is sufficiently neutral and does not alert the judge to possible concerns about viewpoint discrimination, or because (again a
closely overlapping point) it is plausible to argue that the harms, in
the specific covered cases, are sufficiently severe and distinctive to
justify special treatment. This was the issue that in the end divided the Supreme Court.
In his separate opinion in R.A.V., Justice Stevens argued that
the harms were indeed sufficiently distinctive. He wrote: "Just as
Congress may determine that threats against the President entail
more severe consequences than other threats, so St. Paul's City

93 In the following discussion, I draw on Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning,
106 Harv L Rev 741, 759-66 (1993), though I have made a number of new points here. See
also Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Expression ch 7 (cited in note 22),
which discusses R.A.V. and the issue of viewpoint discrimination in more detail.
" This example comes from Snepp v United States, 444 US 507, 510-13 (1980) (per
curiam) (upholding the imposition of a constructive trust on a book produced by a former
CIA agent in contravention of a nondisclosure agreement with the government).
100Lehman v Shaker Heights, 418 US 298, 304 (1974).
101 Greer v Spock, 424 US 828, 838 (1976).
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Council may determine that threats based on the target's race, religion, or gender cause more severe harm to both the target and society than other threats."' 1 2 In his view, "[t]hreatening someone because of her race or religious beliefs may cause particularly severe
trauma or touch off a riot.

. .

such threats may be punished more

severely than threats against someone based on, for example, his
support of a particular athletic team." 10 3 Thus there were "legiti104
mate, reasonable, and neutral justifications" for the special rule.
Justice Stevens' argument is highly reminiscent of the claim that
antipornography legislation should be seen as an acceptable response to harm rather than an imposition of a point of view.
In its response, the Court said that this argument "is wordplay. ' !1 05 The reason that a race-based threat is different "is nothing other than the fact that it is caused by a distinctive idea, conveyed by a distinctive method. The First Amendment cannot be
evaded that easily."10 6 But at first glance, it seems that a legislature could reasonably decide that the harms produced by this narrow category of hate speech are sufficiently severe as to deserve
separate treatment. Surely it seems plausible to say that crossburning, swastikas, and the like are an especially distinctive kind
of "fighting word"-distinctive because of the objective and subjective harm they inflict on their victims and on society in general.
An incident of cross-burning can have large and corrosive social
consequences. A reasonable and sufficiently neutral government
could decide that the same is not true for a hateful attack on
someone's parents, union affiliation, or political convictions.
A harm-based argument of this kind suggests that in singling
out a certain kind of regulable speech for special controls, the legislature is responding not to ideological message, but to real-world
consequences. Unlike in most cases of viewpoint discrimination, it
appears that we have no special reason for suspecting government's
motives. According to Justice Stevens, a state is acting neutrally if
it singles out cross-burning for special punishment, because this

1.2 R.A. V.,

112 S Ct at 2565 (Stevens concurring in the judgment). The relevant statute

is 18 USC § 871 (1988). See also 18 USC § 879 (1988) (regulating threats against former
presidents). Justice Stevens was responding to the majority's argument that laws increasing
the penalty for threats against the President are permissible because the reasons for these
laws relate to the justification for punishing threats in the first place. See text accompanying
note 92.
103 112 S Ct at 2561 (Stevens concurring in the judgment).
104 Id.
105Id at 2548 (majority opinion).
216Id.
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kind of "fighting word" has especially severe social consequences.
According to the Court, on the other hand, a state cannot legitimately decide that cross-burning is worse than (for example) a vicious attack on your political convictions or your parents. A decision to this effect violates neutrality. But the Court's conception of
neutrality seems wrong. There is nothing partisan or illegitimate in
recognizing that this unusual class of fighting words causes distinctive harms.
My claim here is very narrow; I do not argue for broad bans on
hate speech. Most such bans would indeed violate the First
Amendment because they would forbid a good deal of speech that
is intended and received as a contribution to public deliberation.
But here we are dealing with hate speech limited to the exceedingly narrow category of admittedly unprotected fighting words.
The argument on behalf of this kind of restriction might benefit
from Justice Stevens's analogy to the especially severe legal penalties directed toward threats against the President. 10 7 Everyone
seems to agree that this restriction is permissible, because threats
against the President cause distinctive harms and can therefore be
punished more severely. But if the government can single out one
category of threats for special sanction because of the distinctive
harm that those particular threats cause, why cannot the same be
said for the fighting words at issue here?
Justice Scalia's response is probably the best that can be offered: "[T]he reasons why threats of violence are outside the First
Amendment (protecting individuals from fear of violence, from the
disruption that fear engenders, and from the possibility that
threatened violence will occur) have special force when applied to
the President."1 08 But exactly the same could be said of the hate
speech ordinance under discussion: the justification for the fighting
words exemption has special force because of the context of racial
injustice. Here, as in cases involving threats against the President,
we are dealing with a subcategory of unprotected speech challenged as involving impermissible selectivity, and the justification
for the selectivity involves the particular harms of the unprotected
speech at issue. That justification seems sufficiently neutral.
Consider another analogy. Supplemental criminal penalties for
racially-motivated "hate crimes" seem to be a well-established part
of current law, appearing in the statutes of the vast majority of

107 Id at 2565-66 (Stevens concurring in the judgment). See note 102.

108 Id at 2546 (majority opinion).
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states. 0 9 Do those penalties violate the First Amendment? In Wisconsin v Mitchell,1 10 a unanimous Supreme Court said that they do
not, and I believe the Court was right. But consider the fact that
the government imposes the additional penalty because it thinks
that hate crimes create distinctive subjective and objective harm.
The distinctive harm is produced in part because of the symbolic
or expressive nature of hate crimes. This justification is the same
as that in the cross-burning case. This does not mean that it is
impossible to draw distinctions between enhanced penalty statutes
and "hate speech" laws. But it does mean that if the justification
for the hate crimes measures is sufficiently neutral, the same
should be said for narrow restrictions on hate speech.
Perhaps we can respond to this claim with the suggestion that
hate crimes are not speech-not because of discredited versions of
the "speech/conduct" distifiction, but because hate crimes are not
intended and received as contributions to deliberation about anything and do not communicate ideas of any kind."' This was one
of the Supreme Court's major arguments in the Mitchell case. According to the Court, cross-burning is speech, whereas hate crimes
are unprotected conduct." 2 Perhaps laws that regulate conduct are
permissible even if some of the relevant conduct is communicative.
Moreover, it may well be true that most hate crimes do not have a
communicative intention or effect. But some certainly do. The
lynching of black people, for example, is thoroughly communicative. When a hate crime has a communicative purpose, are enhanced penalties invalid if the reason for enhancement is what I
have described? I do not believe that there is anything illegitimate
about the state's belief that the subjective and objective harm justify enhancement.
3
In Mitchell, the Supreme Court relied heavily on this belief."
For this reason, the line between R.A.V. and Mitchell seems quite
thin. As I have emphasized, all the justices in R.A.V. agreed that

0'

See, for example, 46 Fla Stat Ann § 775.085 (West 1992); 720 ILCS 5/12-7.1 (West

1993); 76 Utah Code 1953 ch 3 § 203.3 (Michie 1992 Supp). As of June 23, 1992, forty-six
states had enacted some form of hate crime statute. David G. Savage, Hate Crime Law is
Struck Down, LA Times Al (June 23, 1992). A penalty-enhancement bill for federal criminal cases is currently pending in Congress. Hate Crimes Sentencing Enhancement Act of
1993, HR 1152, 103d Cong, 1st Sess (March 1, 1993). See also Hate Crimes Sentencing En-

hancement Act of 1992, Hearing on HR 4797 before the Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 102d Cong, 2d Sess (1992).
110 113 S Ct 2194 (1993).
" See Section IV.A.
112 113 S Ct at 2199.
I' Id at 2200-01.
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the expressive acts at issue were unprotected by the First Amendment, because the state court had said that the statute was limited
to unprotected "fighting words." R.A.V. therefore involved constitutionally unprotected acts, just as Mitchell did. And everyone in
Mitchell agreed that the First Amendment issue did not disappear
simply because conduct was involved. The Court said that "a physical assault is not by any stretch of the imagination expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment"1 1 4 ; but it rightly added
that a genuine First Amendment issue is raised when a state "enhances the maximum penalty for conduct motivated by a discriminatory point of view." 1 5
Understood in these terms, R.A.V. and Mitchell are very close,
and the Court did not adequately explain the difference between
them. Perhaps the major distinction between the two cases is that
the Minnesota law in R.A.V. covered speech as well as expressive
conduct, and cross-burning is characteristically expressive
-whereas the enhancement statute was directed only at conduct,
and many hate crimes are not intended or received as a communication on anything at all. For this reason, the enhancement penalty
can perhaps be seen as a content-neutral restriction on conduct
that is not ordinarily expressive, while the Minnesota law was a
content-based restriction on speech, including expressive conduct.
This is a reasonable distinction. But it is not clear that the distinction really rescues the R.A.V. outcome. The question remains
whether the state had a legitimate justification for doing what it
did. The Mitchell Court emphasized that the state treated "biasinspired" conduct more severely because that conduct inflicts
"greater individual and societal harm." 11 6 This was Justice Stevens's argument in R.A.V., and it seems to have equal weight in
both cases.
One final analogy seems to suggest that R.A.V. is wrong on the
neutrality issue. The civil rights laws say that you may not fire
someone because of his race, even though you" may fire him for
many other reasons.1 17 On one view, the civil rights laws are therefore unconstitutional, because they penalize someone for his politi-

214

Id at 2199.

115 Id.

Id at 2201.
See Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a)(1), as amended, codified at 42 USC § 2000e2(a)(1) (1988); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v Green, 411 US 792, 800-03 (1973) (discussing
burdens of proof in employment discrimination cases and noting that although an employee
does not have a right to a job, she has the right to a workplace free from unfair
discrimination).
26
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cal convictions. In this respect, they are similar to a prohibition on
flag-burning. They single out conduct (or mere words) for special
penalty simply because of the message communicated by that
conduct.
To be sure, most discriminatory discharges are not intended to
communicate a general political message, but some discharges do
have such an intention. It would be most adventurous, to say the
least, to claim that the First Amendment prohibits application of
the civil rights laws to politically-motivated discrimination. But if
R.A.V. is right on the issue of neutrality, it is not simple to explain
why the civil rights laws survive constitutional attack. Perhaps it
could be said that most discriminatory discharges are not communicative in nature, and that the claim that such discharges are distinctly harmful has a sufficiently neutral justification. Perhaps it
could be said that the civil rights laws sweep up communicative
discharges as an incidental part of an effort to prevent a class of
activities defined in terms of conduct rather than expression. But
if the justification behind the civil rights laws is in fact sufficiently
neutral, the same seems to be true of the statute in the R.A. V.
case.
The arguments from these analogies are not decisive. Plausible
distinctions can be drawn. But some of the distinctions seem thin.
I conclude that as the Mitchell Court held, the First Amendment
is not violated by laws enhancing the punishment of hate crime. I
also conclude that no serious First Amendment problem is raised
by the civil rights laws, even though those laws sometimes punish
speech. And a restriction on cross-burning and other symbolic hate
speech is a permissible subject-matter classification, so long as the
restriction is narrowed in the way described.
In R.A.V. the Supreme Court offered a tempting and clever
response:
In its practical 'operation, moreover, the ordinance goes even
beyond mere content discrimination to actual viewpoint discrimination. Displays containing some words-odious racial
epithets, for example-would be prohibited to proponents of
all views. But 'fighting words' that do not themselves invoke
race, color, creed, religion, or gender-aspersions based upon
a person's mother, for example-would be seemingly usable
ad libitum in the placards of those arguing in favor of racial,
color, etc. tolerance and equality, but could not be used by
that speaker's opponents. . . . St. Paul has no such authority
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to license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensbury Rules. 118
The short answer to this argument is that the ordinance at issue
does not embody viewpoint discrimination as that term is ordinarily understood. Viewpoint discrimination occurs if the government
takes one side in a debate, as in, for example, a law saying that
libel of the President will be punished more severely than libel of
anyone else. Viewpoint discrimination is not established by the
fact that in some hypotheticals, one side has greater means of expression than another, at least-and this is the critical point-if
the restriction on means has legitimate, neutral justifications.
We can make this point by reference to the fact that it is a
federal crime to threaten the life of the President. Recall that the
Supreme Court said in R.A.V. that such statutes are permissible
even though they make distinctions within the category of unprotected threats. Imagine the following conversation: John: "I will
kill the President." Jill: "I will kill anyone who threatens to kill the
President." John has committed a federal crime; Jill has not. In
this sense, the presidential threat case involves the same kind of de
facto viewpoint discrimination as the R.A.V. case. If it is not unconstitutional for that reason"'-and the Court indicated that it is
not-the Court should not have found the statute in R.A.V. viewpoint discriminatory.
The point has general implications. It suggests that the state
can attack hate speech dealing with certain matters, as Stanford
has done, without running afoul of the prohibition on impermissible selectivity. It also suggests that some narrowly drawn viewpoint
discriminatory restrictions-protecting against hate speech directed at blacks or women-might well be permissible.1 2 0 Thus, for
example, a locality might decide that cross-burning and hate
speech directed against blacks pose special risks not posed by hate
speech directed against whites. For the reasons I have outlined, I
do not believe that there is anything illegitimate about a public
judgment that hate speech against blacks creates distinctive subjective and objective harm.

112 S Ct at 2547-48.
See the discussion of pornography in Section III.A.
120 See Amar, 106 Harv L Rev at 151-61 (cited in note 21).
11
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Hate Speech, Neutrality, and the University

In the previous Section, I argued for the constitutionality of
narrow restrictions on hate speech, but R.A. V. suggests that courts
might invalidate such restrictions as unacceptably selective. After
R.A.V., a university might well be forbidden to single olit for punishment speech that many universities want to control: (a) a narrowly defined category of insults toward such specifically enumerated groups as blacks, women, and homosexuals; or (b) a narrowly
defined category of insults directed at individuals involving race,
sex, and sexual orientation. Under current law, a restriction that
involves (a) is viewpoint-based, and to that extent worse than the
restriction in R.A. V. itself. A restriction that involves (b) is a subject-matter restriction, not based on viewpoint, 121 but it is still impermissibly selective in the same sense as the restriction invalidated in the R.A.V. case. We might think that the conclusions in
R.A.V. are incorrect in principle, because there are sufficiently neutral grounds for restrictions (a) and (b): A public university could
neutrally decide that epithets directed against blacks, women, and
homosexuals cause distinctive harms.1 22 But this conclusion is hard
to reconcile with the R.A.V. decision.
If such conclusions are to be resisted-if R.A.V. does not apply to the campus-it must be because public universities can
claim a degree of insulation from judicial supervision. The principal point here is that colleges and universities are often in the
business of controlling speech, and their controls are hardly ever
thought to raise free speech problems.2 3 There are major limits on
what students can say in the classroom. For example, they cannot
discuss the presidential election if the subject is math. The same is
true for faculty members. Universities also impose restrictive rules
of decorum and civic participation. A teacher can even require students to treat each other with basic respect. It would certainly be
legitimate to suspend a student for using consistently abusive language in the classroom, even if that language would receive firm
constitutional protection on the street corner.
The problem goes deeper. A paper or examination that goes
far afield from the basic approach of the course can be penalized
without offense to the First Amendment. Usually the penalty is a
121 But see R.A.V., 112 S Ct at 2545.
122 Recall that a private university can do whatever it likes.
123 See Mary Becker, Conservative Free Speech and the Uneasy

Case for JudicialReview, 64 U Colo L Rev 975 (1993). I am very grateful to Mary Becker for helpful discussion
of the subject in this section.
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form of subject-matter restriction, but it may well turn out to be
viewpoint-based in practice. In many places, a student who defends fascism or communism is unlikely to receive a good grade,
and not only because it is hard to argue well on behalf of fascism
or communism. Viewpoint discrimination is undoubtedly pervasive
in practice, and even though it is usually objectionable, courts cannot and perhaps should not attempt to police it. This is not so only
for judgments about student performance. Initial hirings, tenure,
and promotion all involve subject matter restrictions, and in practice viewpoint discrimination as well.
These examples do not mean that any and all censorship is
acceptable in an academic setting. It does not even mean that existing viewpoint discrimination is constitutionally acceptable. A
university can have a good deal of power over what happens in the
classroom, so as to promote the educational enterprise, without
also being allowed to decree a political orthodoxy by discriminating on the basis of viewpoint. If a public university were to ban
students from defending certain causes in political science classes,
a serious free speech issue would be raised. There are therefore
real limits to permissible viewpoint discrimination within the classroom, even if it is hard for courts to police the relevant boundaries.
Certainly the university's legitimate control over the classroom
does not extend to the campus in general. A university could not
say that outside of class, students can talk only about subjects of
the university's choice (excluding, say, a war, or feminism, or race
relations, or AIDS). From these various propositions, we might
conclude that the university can impose subject-matter or other
restrictionson speech only to the extent that the restrictionsare
reasonablyrelated to its educational mission. If a university is to
educate, it must discriminate on the basis of quality and subject
matter, and these forms of discrimination will inevitably shade
over into certain forms of viewpoint discrimination.1 2 But in cases
in which the educational mission is not reasonably at stake, restrictions on speech should not stand. Certainly this would be true in
most cases in which a university attempts to impose an orthodoxy,
whether inside or outside the classroom.
How does this bear on the hate speech issue? Perhaps a university could permissibly conclude that its educational mission requires unusually firm controls on this kind of speech, so as not to
124 In this respect, the question of speech restrictions in the university is close to the
question of selective funding of art. See Sunstein, The PartialConstitution at 308-15 (cited
in note 3).
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compromise the values of education itself. The university might
think, for example, that it has a special obligation to protect its
students as free and equal members of the community. It might
believe that certain narrowly defined forms of hate speech are
highly destructive to the students' chance to learn. Perhaps a university should have more leeway to restrict hate speech than a
state or locality, precisely because it ought to receive the benefit of
the doubt when it invokes concerns of this kind. At least courts
should be reluctant to second-guess judgments of this sort when
the university can plausibly claim that it needs a relatively narrow
restriction in order to safeguard the educational mission.
This point bears on two issues. First, it suggests that universities might be allowed to enact mildly broader restrictions than
states and localities. The educational mission ought to grant the
university somewhat greater room to maneuver, especially in light
of the complexity and delicacy of the relevant policy questions.
Second, the point suggests that courts should be reluctant to find
viewpoint discrimination -or impermissible selectivity. Perhaps
there should be a presumption in favor of a university's judgment
that hate speech directed at blacks or women, or showing racial or
gender hatred, produces harm that is especially threatening to the
educational enterprise.
This conclusion is buttressed by two additional factors. First,
there are numerous colleges and universities; many students can
choose among a range of alternatives, and a restriction in one, two,
or more imposes an extremely small incursion into the system of
free expression. Colleges that restrict a large amount of speech
may find themselves with few students. Second, the Constitution is
itself committed to the elimination of second-class citizenship, and
this commitment makes it hard to say that an educational judgment opposed to certain narrowly described forms of hate speech
is impermissibly partisan.
I think that an analysis of this kind makes sense for narrowly
defined hate speech restrictions. Consider the Stanford regulation
described above. If a public university adopted that restriction, the
major constitutional problem, fueled by the outcome in R.A.V.,
would not be breadth but unacceptable selectivity. Why has the
university not controlled other forms of "fighting words," like the
word "fascist," or "commie," or "bastard"? Does its selectivity
show an impermissible motivation? Should we find its selectivity
to be impermissibly partisan? I do not think that we should. Notwithstanding R.A.V., a university could reasonably and neutrally
decide that the harms caused by the regulated fighting words are,
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at least in the university setting, more severe than the harms
caused by other kinds of fighting words.
IV. CONDUCT As

SPEECH, WORDS

As

CONDUCT

Free speech law has been bedeviled by the "speech-condu~t"
distinction. In this Section, I argue that some forms of conduct
should be treated as speech, but that some words should not be
treated as speech. A general conclusion follows from the argument:
The constitutional protection of "speech" refers to something that
we should consider a term of art. That term covers all symbols that
are intended and received as expressing messages. Under this view,
some words are not "speech" within the meaning of the First
Amendment, and some "conduct" does qualify as speech. Under
this view, we should make no rigid distinction between "speech"
and "conduct." We should distinguish instead between words and
conduct, with the understanding that the Constitution protects
speech, a term that includes some, but hardly all, words and conduct. And under this view, a theory of free speech value, referred
to in Section I, helps explain why some conduct is regulable only
(a) on a content-neutral basis or (b) when government can make
the ordinary showing required for restriction of political speech.
A.

Conduct As Speech

What counts as speech within the meaning of the First
Amendment? Justice Black famously thought that the Constitution protected "speech" absolutely and "conduct" not at all.125 But
no purely formal test can tell us what falls within the two categories. Someone burns a flag as part of a war protest. The "conduct"
communicates ideas. Moreover, it communicates ideas in a distinctive way. Should it be excluded from the category of "speech"?
Surely not. "Speech" consists of symbols that communicate
messages. 128 Words are simply one kind of symbol. The category of
speech is not coextensive with the category of words. Flag-burning,
insofar as it is a symbol that communicates a message, is speech. It
may be regulable on a content-neutral basis, or even on the basis

121See Cohen v California, 403 US 15, 27 (1971) (Blackmun dissenting) (an opinion
that Justice Black joined, arguing that petitioners' action was unprotected because it was
conduct and not speech); see also Thomas Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression
8, 17-18 (Random House, 1970) (making an expression-action distinction).
126

See Amar, 106 Harv L Rev at 133-37 (cited in note 21).
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of content when there is harm of a certain nature and degree, but
that is a different matter.
Words then are signs-symbols of expressive meaning. But the
category of symbols of expressive meaning is not limited to words.
Sign language, for example, does not consist of words, but it is entitled to constitutional protection. The same is true for the "act" of
wearing an armband,12

7

or of joining a demonstration. 128 The con-

stitutional protection of speech should not stop with words. The
term "speech" is best understood to include all symbols of expressive meaning, whatever the form of those symbols.
The point seems inescapable if we accept the view that speech
qualifies for protection if it is intended and received as a contribution to social deliberation about some issue. If speech is entitled to
special protection because and when it does this, any sharp line
between "words" and "expressive conduct" becomes extremely artificial. Some forms of conduct, like flag-burning, have an expressive and communicative character. Their purpose and effect are to
express a political message. They are part of social deliberation. In
this way they qualify as "speech," regulable only if the government
can generate a strong, sufficiently neutral justification. Or suppose
that we accept a narrower understanding of the free speech principle, believing speech to be protected, or specially protected, if and
only if it is connected with democratic processes. A sharp line between words and expressive acts cannot be justified in terms of
democratic values, for much expressive conduct is intended and received as a contribution to democratic discussion. The constitutional protection covers "speech"; acts that qualify as signs with
expressive meaning should qualify as speech within the meaning of
the Constitution.
This is hardly to say that the government can never regulate
expressive conduct. On the contrary, government often does have a
special and sufficiently neutral justification for regulating such
conduct. Protection of the President from assassination, or the
Lincoln Memorial from graffiti, 129 can be supported by reference to

powerful, legitimate reasons, such as keeping the peace and protecting public monuments. When the government regulates expressive conduct, it is usually trying to promote a purpose entirely unrelated to the suppression of communication. But some restrictions
on expressive conduct, like those on flag-burning, may well not be
127 Tinker v Des Moines Community School District, 393 US 503, 505-07
128 Edwards v South Carolina, 372 US 229, 235-38 (1963).
128 Texas v Johnson, 491 US 397, 434 (1989) (Rehnquist dissenting).

(1969).
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supportable in this way. Thus in the flag-burning cases, the Supreme Court emphasized that the government did not have a reason for regulation independent of the government's objection to
the ideas that flag-burning embodies. The justification for regulation was illegitimate.1 30
On this view, the speech-conduct distinction has been made
necessary not because expressive conduct is undeserving of protection, but because government frequently has a sufficiently strong
and neutral justification for regulating conduct. The key to the distinction, often thought to lie in the determination of whether the
conduct qualifies for initial protection, actually lies in the fact that
government often has good reasons for regulating it-just as it has
good reasons for applying the trespass laws to political demonstrations." 1 Now that much expressive conduct has been understood
to qualify for protection, courts can focus on what is really the central question: the existence of acceptably strong and neutral
justifications.
Thus far, then, we have seen that conduct carrying a political
message qualifies as speech within the meaning of the First
Amendment. The same conclusion rightly follows for other conduct, like dance, that is both expressive and communicative even if
nonpolitical. When it is expressive and communicative but
nonpolitical, such conduct belongs in a second tier of protection, at
least if we accept a two-tier view of the First Amendment. 32 Such
speech is regulable more easily than political speech, but it is protected in the absence of neutral justifications.'3 3
See id at 410-14; United States v Eichman, 496 US 310, 315-18 (1990).
131 See Adderley v Florida,385 US 39 (1966).
1o

131 See Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Expression ch 5 (cited in note
22). On this view, government would have the power to regulate some forms of (for example)

nude dancing. Such dancing does warrant at least a degree of First Amendment protection.
It is both communicative and expressive. But a state could plausibly decide that some kinds
of nude dancing are associated with a range of serious real-world harms, including prostitution, criminal activity of various sorts, and sexual assault. See Barnes v Glen Theatre, 111 S

Ct 2456, 2468-71 (1991) (Souter concurring). At least this is so if government can muster
evidence that the regulated form of nude dancing does produce these harms, which would be
sufficient to justify regulation under the lower-tier speech standards. I conclude that the

Supreme Court was probably correct to rule that the First Amendment did not protect nude
dancing in the Kitty Kat Lounge. Id at 2463. This is so even if the majority erred in emphasizing the state's moral reservations about public nudity rather than the existence of more
tangible harms. See id at 2461-63. Of course, a quite different issue would be raised in a case
in which nude dancing was part of a political protest, or if the particular acts could not
plausibly be associated with real-world harms.
...It is insufficient to respond that if people want to convey a message, they should be
required to do so through words rather than action. A message cannot be so readily separated from the particular means chosen to express it; if the means are changed, the message
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I conclude that what is apparently conduct should qualify as
speech for First Amendment purposes if it is intended and received as an effort to communicate a message. This conclusion
might seem to have extreme consequences-for example, an attempted assassination of the President may well qualify as speech.
It does not raise anything like a serious free speech question, however, because government can invoke strong content-neutral reasons for protecting the President's life. But under this test, flagburning, draft-card burning, and cross-burning all qualify as
speech; indeed this classification is the easy part of the relevant
cases.
B.

Words As Conduct

We have seen that some of what is familiarly characterized as
"conduct" actually counts as speech. The converse may also be
true. Suppose that the head of a computer company asks the head
of other computer companies whether they might not agree to fix
prices. Suppose we have nothing but talk, but the talk produces a
conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act. Or suppose that an
employer discharges an employee by saying, "I don't want people
of your religion to work for me." There is no free speech problem
in either case. But it is not easy to explain why.
I suggest that we might distinguish among (a) speech that
amounts to the commission of an independently illegal act or that
is evidence that the act has been committed; (b) speech that creates or constitutes conditions that can constitutionally be made illegal; (c) speech that leads immediately to illegality; (d) speech
that is produced as a result of illegality; and (e) speech that leads
proximately, but not immediately, to illegality or otherwise to constitutionally cognizable harm. My hypothesis is that speech falling
in category (a) is properly treated as action, even if it consists
solely of words. Words and conduct that fall within categories (b),
(c), (d), and (e) all qualify as speech, and they may be regulable
only under the standards set out in Sections I and IV.A.
Let us start with a straightforward explanation for the wordsconduct distinction. Perhaps words are classified as conduct when
they offer no ideas. If the First Amendment protects the exchange

changes too. Form and content cannot be distinguished so simply. Flag-burning conveys the
relevant message more sharply and distinctively than anything else. If the speaker says instead, "My country is doing wrong," the message will be so muted as to be fundamentally
transformed. The availability of purely verbal alternative forms of expression cannot therefore justify failing to protect expressive conduct.
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of ideas, then price-fixing agreements, threats, bribes, and unlawful
discharges probably do not count as speech within the meaning of
the Amendment. Alternatively, suppose that the First Amendment
protects speech that is intended and received as a contribution to
social deliberation about some issue,134 or that words deserve to be
treated as speech when their regulation would be an insult to the
moral autonomy of the speaker or the listener.13 5 On either of these
views, the suppression of some words may not threaten the values
that underlie a system of free expression and may be justified if
there are sufficient real-world harms.
On this view, the treatment of some words as "conduct" provides a shorthand, if misleading, description of a more extended
argument that the speech at issue does not promote First Amendment values and creates sufficient harms to be regulable under the
appropriate standards. Here, the regulation of the relevant forms
of speech does not really stem from a distinction between speech
and conduct, but instead from an argument about value and
harms. When it is said that certain speech is regulable as "conduct," what is actually meant is that the speech at issue lies far
from the center of constitutional concern and that it is harmful
enough to be regulable.
This much seems true; but I want to try a different argument.
Perhaps some cases involve something that is properly characterized as conduct rather than speech. The written or oral statement,
"You're fired," is an act,13 6 not merely speech, in the sense that the
words are simply a way of committing an unlawful discharge. The
statement, "I agree to fix prices with you," is a way of fixing prices,
indeed the most efficient way of doing so. These words do not
merely cause action; they constitute the relevant action. The same
appears to be true of purely verbal sexual harassment. If someone
says to an employee, "Sleep with me or lose your job," we say that
he is committing an act of harassment. The words do not cause the
act. The words are the act. The same is plausibly true of bribery,
perjury, and threats. Most free speech cases-even those in which
people lose their free speech claims-are very different. If a political revolutionary encourages someone to take over a building, we
may have incitement, and it may be regulable; but it is not action.

See Scanlon, 1 Phil & Pub Aff at 214-15, 222-24 (cited in note 41).
"" David A. Strauss, Persuasion,Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 Colum L

'3

Rev 334, 353-60 (1991).
'36The argument here obviously has connections with J.L. Austin, How to Do Things
With Words (Clarendon, 2d ed 1975), but I will not deal with those connections here.
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This argument suggests that some statements are properly
classified as conduct because they amount to the commission of
acts that are legitimately and independently made unlawful. For
example, a racially motivated discharge is low-value speech that
creates harms sufficient to justify regulation. But we can also say
that the discharge is an independently unlawful act. A purely verbal discharge is simply a means of committing the unlawful act.
We are now prepared to offer some distinctions. The statement, "You're black, and therefore fired," is a version of (a). The
words are simply a means of committing an independently unlawful act; they are that act. Sexual harassment can be analyzed in a
broadly similar fashion. If someone says, "Sleep with me or lose
your job," the statement is a way of violating the civil rights laws.
Or suppose that an employer posts violent pornography all over
the workplace, so that wherever a woman goes, she sees sexual violence aimed against women. It would be fully plausible to say that
posting the pornography violates the civil rights laws.1 37 We could
conclude not that the posting "leads to" or "causes" such a violation, but that it is a violation.
But, on reflection, the sexual harassment cases fall in category
(b) rather than (a). They differ from a discriminatory discharge in
that the latter is independently illegal, and the words are simply
evidence that a discriminatory discharge has taken place. They are
evidence of the illegality because a pretextually work-related but
really discriminatory discharge is also illegal, even if discriminatory
words were not used. When the words are used in court, they are
evidence of the underlying illegality, that is, the discharge based
on a discriminatory motive. It is the discharge itself that is unlawful. There remains the question whether a discriminatorily motivated discharge can be made unlawful consistently with the First
Amendment; I have discussed this issue in Section III, and in any
case R.A.V. seems to suggest that Congress can constitutionally
outlaw a general category of acts that includes some expressive
conduct. My basic claim here is that certain verbal expression is a
way of performing an illegal act, and that there is no problem in
classifying such expression as the act itself, at least when the words
are evidence that the illegality has occurred.
Purely verbal sexual harassment can be made illegal, but it is
not evidence of an independently illegal act. Instead it creates or
137 See Robinson v Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F Supp 1486, 1524-25 (M D Fla 1991).
This case is currently on appeal before the Eleventh Circuit. See Howard Troxler, What
More Unlikely Foes? NOW vs. ACLU, St Petersburg Times 1B (Nov 4, 1991).
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constitutes conditions that can be made unlawful. This is true for
quid pro quo harassment; it is also true of the "hostile-environment" harassment, including the pornography case. Both of these
are versions of (b), and in an important way different from (a).
Cases that fall in category (b) are harder than those in category
(a). They are harder because the government is targeting words
themselves rather than words as evidence of an independent illegality. Often the government might want to claim that a statement
amounts to the commission of an illegal act, or helps create conditions that violate some law. Whether it can do so depends on the
ordinary standards applied to regulation of speech. In other words,
government must say something about the issues of value and
harm. The view that sexual harassment is regulable under (b) depends on a resolution of those issues.
At least in the ordinary run of cases, no serious free speech
question is raised by legal controls on purely verbal sexual harassment. This is not because such harassment is conduct, but because
it belongs in a lower tier of protection, and because the relevant
harms are sufficient to justify regulation. A full justification of
these claims would require a more extended statement than I can
offer here. But it seems clear that workplace harassment is not intended and received as a contribution to the exchange of ideas, and
also that it is not closely connected with speaker or (especially)
listener autonomy. It is for this reason that the prevention of discrimination seems clearly sufficient to override the relatively weak
free speech interests.
Many cases of "speech brigaded with action"'' 8 are really versions of (c). Consider the words "Ready, Set, Fire" said to a firing
squad; or, "Kill, Rover" said to a trained attack dog.'$ 9 These cases
do not involve conduct, and they are also quite different from (a)
and (b). We should think of them as low-value speech causing immediate harm, and therefore as readily bannable. But they do not
count as conduct or action standing by themselves.
How do pornography and hate speech fare under this approach? I believe that they generally fall in categories (d) and (e).
Category (c) is inapplicable because imminent harm, let alone intended harm, can rarely be connected with any particular material. 14 0 If the government is trying to regulate the material because

135 See Brandenburg v Ohio, 395 US 444, 456 (1969) (Douglas concurring).
I'l See MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified at 156 (cited in note 24) ("But which is

saying 'kill' to a trained guard dog, a word or an act?").
10 Thus the standards in Brandenburg are not likely to be met.
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it was produced through illegality-case (e)-it is trying to regulate speech, not conduct. If there is illegality in the production of
the material, the case may involve acceptable regulation under category (d) but not because the material is itself "conduct." Under
existing law, category (e) does not allow for regulation.' 41 It follows
from all this that we cannot justify regulation of hate speech and
pornography on the ground that these forms of speech constitute
action-although the presence of action in the production of
materials, or action as a result of the use of the materials, may be
relevant to the First Amendment inquiry. An interesting question
is whether we can use the pornography in the workplace example-category (b)-as a ground for saying that some pornography
is action, analytically speaking. At this point it is not easy to see
how this argument can be made persuasively. I conclude that most
pornography is speech, not conduct, but that it is sometimes bannable for the reasons stated in Sections I and IV.A.
V.

FUTURE STRATEGIES

I have questioned the outcomes in both R.A.V. and Hudnut.
But so long as those decisions stand, there are sharp constitutional
limits on regulation of hate speech and pornography. It is, of
course, important to inquire whether current law is correct, especially in light of the fact that free speech doctrine sometimes
changes rapidly. But it would be most disappointing if those interested in eliminating the harms caused by pornography and hate
speech were to restrict themselves to criticizing what may well become firmly entrenched law. An important task for the future will
be to develop responses to the new legal developments. When pornography is harmful, what approaches should be taken by those
concerned with minimizing the relevant harms? If we aim to eliminate caste-like features of current systems, what approaches would
make sense?
It is clear that the prevention of violence against women-an
important aspect of these caste-like features-might be made a
greater priority of state and federal government. There are substantial initiatives in this direction, quite outside of the category of
speech.4 2 These initiatives, sometimes criticized as an unjustified
incursion into the federal structure, fit exceedingly well with the
141

See Brandenburg,395 US at 447 (speech must incite or produce "imminent lawless

action").
142 See, for example, Violence Against Women Act of 1993, S 11, 103d Cong, 1st Sess
(Jan 21, 1993).
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post-Civil War Constitution, which has as one of its purposes the
use of federal authority to prevent the disproportionate subjection
of certain groups to public and private violence. It seems clear, too,
that sexual violence is not only an inadequately enforced crime; it
is also an inadequately addressed tort. There should be a range of
civil actions against people, including pornographers, who have
abused children and women in the home or in the production of
their work. An important advantage of this route is that the "reasonable doubt" standard of criminal law need not be met, and recovery can occur under the civil law's more lenient "preponderance
of the evidence" standard. Here the First Amendment issues are

trivial. Well-publicized tort actions might also deter criminal activity and spur new statutory initiatives.
Moreover, content-neutral laws might be invoked to prevent

hate speech, hate crimes, and injuries that result from pornography. For example, the law of trespass can and should be used
against cross-burning. Universities can use general requirements of
civility and decent behavior to stop hate speech-not as part of
specialized speech codes, but as part of a less selective ban on conduct on campus inconsistent with educational requirements. Prosecutors can pay special attention to criminal acts that reflect racial
hatred or misogyny. We should encourage greater enforcement efforts to protect against child pornography. Current obscenity law
offers considerable opportunity to proceed against materials that
involve violence or coercion in their production and use. When allocating scarce resources, prosecutors should proceed against such
materials, not against materials that are offensive because of their
sexual explicitness.
We should also encourage much more experimentation with a
wide range of different kinds of legal approaches to the problem of
pornography. There is no reason for localities to believe themselves
bound to take the judicially-invalidated Dworkin/MacKinnon ordinance as the universal model for regulation of pornography. A constitutional banality is pertinent here: One of the principal advantages of a federal system is that it offers enormous scope for
experimentation. R.A.V. and Hudnut, taken together, mean that
courts will quickly strike down many imaginable regulations of
pornography. In these circumstances it makes sense to have a
broad range of proposals, in order to escape the problems of selectivity, vagueness, and overbreadth. 14 3 Some localities might try, for

"' Kagan,

60 U Chi L Rev at 883-901 (cited in note 31).
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example, to regulate a subcategory of speech that is already regulable under Miller. Other localities might combine the obscenity
and pornography approaches and exempt from control all speech
with serious social value. Those are simply some of a large number
of possible experiments designed to do some good while increasing
the chances of judicial validation.
Finally, private or public pressure might be brought to bear
against material that sexualizes violence, especially when the material appears on television or in movies. A promising model is provided by an innovative measure enacted through the initiative of
Senator Paul Simon in 1990.144 Senator Simon's statute exempts
from the antitrust laws any effort by the television networks to reduce violence on television. This measure does not require any
145
agreement among the networks. It does not censor any speech.
But it does say that an agreed-upon set of principles will not violate the antitrust laws. In this way, it encourages networks to reach
agreements that would otherwise be unlawful.
The Simon initiative is especially valuable insofar as it recognizes that competition for viewers can lead to an undesirable state
of affairs, one in which there is an increasing incidence of violence.
In late 1992, the networks did indeed reach a shared set of principles. 4s The agreement should significantly affect programming in
1993 and after. Among other things, the new principles say that
programs should not depict violence as glamorous or as an acceptable solution to human conflict; should avoid gratuitous violence;
and should avoid mixtures of sex and violence. Perhaps it will be
possible to build on this idea to counteract some of the problems of
the broadcasting media, without resorting to government regulation at all.

144 Television Program Improvement Act of 1990, Pub L No 101-650, Title V, §501, 104
Stat 5127 (Dec 1, 1990), codified at 47 USC § 303(c) (Supp 1992).
145 There is, however, a possible First Amendment issue under the R.A.V. decision. It
would clearly be unlawful to exempt from the antitrust laws any agreement to limit criticism of the President. The question then becomes whether a subject matter exemption, limited to violence, is unacceptably selective in the same sense as the law invalidated by the
R.A.V. Court. I do not believe that there is unacceptable selectivity in the light of the absence of viewpoint discrimination, the plausibility of the claim of harm, and the lack of
reason for suspicion about viewpoint discrimination.
1,O Matt Marshall and John Lippman, Big 3 Networks Agree to "Limit" Violence on
TV, LA Times Al (Dec 12, 1992).
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CONCLUSION

I have made three claims in this Essay. First, certain narrowly
defined categories of pornography and hate speech can be regulated consistently with the First Amendment. They count as "low
value" speech, and they cause sufficient harms to be regulable
under existing standards. Broadly speaking, the argument for regulating pornography is stronger than the corresponding argument
for regulating hate speech, on both the value and the harm sides;
but some well-defined categories of hate speech might be subject to
legal controls. Second, the prominent objections from neutrality
are misplaced. Some regulations of pornography and hate speech
can be neutrally justified, even if they appear discriminatory on
the basis of content, subject matter, or even viewpoint. They can
be neutrally justified in large part because of the anticaste principle. Third, we should jettison the "speech-conduct" distinction in
favor of an approach that explores whether the symbols at issue
are intended and received as a contribution to the exchange of
ideas about some issue.
Under this approach, flag-burning, cross-burning, and much
else will qualify as speech, though it may be bannable because of
sufficiently neutral justifications. Under this approach, moreover,
some "words" do not qualify as speech, because they amount to a
way of committing an independently unlawful act. These claims
raise many questions and leave a number of ambiguities. But they
will resolve the vast majority of issues raised by government regulation of pornography and hate speech and help orient treatment
of the rest.
I have also outlined a number of possible approaches for those
who seek to prevent the harms produced by pornography, hate
speech, and hate crimes. A particular priority is to attack those
harms through measures that (a) do not implicate speech at all and
(b) are content-neutral if they do implicate speech. Strategies of
this kind cannot counteract all of the harms produced by hate
speech and pornography. But they can do a great deal of good, and
so long as Hudnut and R.A. V. stand as the law, they are, I suggest,
among the best routes for the future.
A more general lesson follows from these claims. The concerns
about pornography and hate speech are in one sense new, but in
another sense very old; they recall the original goal of the Civil
War Amendments: the elimination of caste systems. As I have emphasized, the caste-like features of current practices are not as severe as those of traditional caste systems, but they are nonetheless
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conspicuous. An important element of those practices consists of
the disproportionate subjection of women and blacks to public and
private violence and to frequent intrusions on their self-respect-the time-honored constitutional notion of stigma. 147 Many
imaginable limits on sexually explicit materials and on racist
speech would indeed violate the First Amendment. But, I suggest
that narrow and well-defined legal controls on pornography and
hate speech are simply a part of the attack on systems of racial
and gender caste. If they are understood in this light, and if they
are appropriately narrow and clear, they can operate without making significant intrusions into a well-functioning system of free
expression.
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Brown v Board of Education of Topeka, 347 US 483, 493-95 (1954).

